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Narrating the 
story of a failed 
national transition: 
discourses on the 
Greek crisis,  
2010–2014
Following the outbreak of its sovereign debt cri-
sis, Greece received its first international bailout 
in 2010 and the second in 2012, both of which 
were linked to major austerity measures such 
as spending cuts, new taxes, structural reforms 
and privatisations. At the same time, the period 
was constantly accompanied by the imminent 
danger of a “Grexit”, bankruptcies and more res-
cue mechanisms. Far from being a mere eco-
nomic crisis, this recession – the most severe 
ever experienced since the Second World War 
by an established democracy – has had tre-
mendous consequences on Greek society and 
everyday life. The traditional party system has 
collapsed, grassroots politics are flourishing, 
the popularity of the left-wing Syriza party grew 
out of proportion, while the neo-Nazi Golden 
Dawn entered parliament for the first time; at 
the same time, unemployment reached unprec-
edented levels, more than a million workers are 
owed back pay, a growing number of citizens 
are threatened with poverty and hunger, and 
major parts of the populace – pensioners, wom-
en, youth – are experiencing social exclusion. 
The events since early 2010 have accelerated 
the way time is experienced by the citizens of 
this country in the periphery of Europe, which 
has been apparently undergoing what can be 
termed as “history in the making”. But history 
is not constructed of facts; it is constructed in 
the way we anticipate, perceive, interpret and 
narrate those facts in relation to our past and 
our future. Those “historic moments” have pro-
duced, thus, conflicting narratives that attempt 
to explain the causes of this crisis and put a be-
fore-and-after sequence on what is perceived 
as a transition for the country’s trajectory over 
time within the European community. In the first 
part of this article, we focus on the dominant, 
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promemorandum discourse that has been propagated by the political establishment and main-
stream media since the outset of the crisis and that interprets the current crisis as a crisis of Greek 
identity: Greece failed to reform where necessary due to the domination of the traditional political 
culture (over a “modern” one) that is to blame for the failed transition since 1974 to postwar Euro-
pean modernity. The second part of this article situates this dominant narrative within the broader 
context of scholarly literature and academic discourses that have attempted, in different periods 
and in diverse ways, to conceptualise and prescribe the transition to modernity followed not only 
by Greece, but by other societies the world over. By unfolding the creation of this “failed transition” 
story while examining it in relation to broader narratives and discourses, this brief study forms a 
vantage point from which to observe how history is experienced by societies in crisis and, thus, 
witness “history in the making”.
1. National and transnational transitions (1974–2014): from authoritarianism 
to democracy and from democracy to demo-crisis
To begin with, we will very briefly sketch the historical path followed by the country since the end 
of the dictatorship so as to set the background against which our analysis is conducted.1 Within 
the context of this article, the ongoing crisis is understood as a contingent and multifaceted prod-
uct of national history and local traditions as entangled within broader European developments 
and global changes. 
The period of the “metapolitefsi” – a term meaning “regime change” that was used initially for the 
transition to democracy in 1974 but eventually to refer to the entire third Greek republic – was, on the 
one hand, one of economic stagnation and deindustrialisation and, on the other, high political and so-
cial expectations. The country was sailing in two boats going in the opposite direction: while from the 
1950s to 1970s Western European countries experienced the formation of the welfare state, in south-
ern Europe this remained in an embryonic state. In Greece, for instance, the dictatorship period was 
characterised by state expansion without welfare and, in this respect, it did not constitute a rupture, 
but a continuation with postwar economic priorities regarding financial stability, wage controls, and 
foreign or state investments in public works and industrial infrastructure. On the other hand, after the 
decades-long suppression of social movements and a ban on trade unionism, the metapolitefsi was 
an era of labour and student protests, intense popular mobilisations and increasing expectations of 
social improvement. Bridging the two through economic policies never occurred, as both conserv-
ative and socialist governments opted for state expansion, although they swore by private initiative; 
the public-sector workforce was expanded and bankrupt industries nationalised so as to counterbal-
ance the unemployment created by economic stagnation. Public borrowing was the only means to 
offer welfare policies. The increasing vulnerability caused by the rising public debt and the expansion 
of the state was far from a national particularity caused by social backwardness or domestic men-
talities; on the contrary, such a paradoxical reality has been an inherent phenomenon of European 
politics in the postwar period, characterised by generalised upward social mobility and the conflating 
of consumerism with the ideas of an affluent society: the widespread social and political expectations 
of postauthoritarian societies were as vital as the economic ones. 
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But the recent crisis is not causally related solely to this paradox of the 1980s, but also to the trans-
formations of democracy taking place throughout the 1990s around Europe. It was also helped 
by European Union treaties such as Maastricht: this decade of globalisation and European inte-
gration was a period of economic expansion, low interest rates and credit expansion, which was 
experienced with increasing optimism, especially by the Mediterranean countries that saw their 
economies transformed. What actually took place at the same time through the deregulation of 
the economy and labour legislation, however, was the dismantling of the postwar social contract, 
which was further challenged by the mass influx of migrants and refugees to the EU. Even if the 
new landscape appeared tolerant to pluralism and difference, gender equality and the increasing 
role of nonstate actors in politics, the backbone of the postwar democratic consensus was being 
dismantled: along with the downgrading of industry, trade unionism was marginalised, political 
parties became alienated from their constituencies and decision-making was transferred from the 
public realm to a narrow circle of experts consisting of European Commission bureaucrats and 
high-ranking officials, think tanks and large banking corporations. The literature has termed this 
as a shift from participatory democracy to a period of “post-democracy”,2 which came about with-
out any of the ruptures that were encountered in the shift from authoritarianism to democracy. The 
term “demo-crisis” signifies semantically that the idea of the demos as a progressive social agent 
became a regressive force, an impediment to the modernising initiatives of the elites. 
2. Narrating the crisis as a failed transition to modernity
Notwithstanding this conflation of global and local realities that has generated a crisis that is far from 
national and much broader than financial, the dominant interpretation since the outset has been tell-
ing the story of a predictable crisis that was a long time coming, one that was to be expected from 
a country that never managed to modernise enough in spite of the opportunities offered through its 
membership of the EU.3 Instead, what prevailed were the legacies of a backward political culture fed 
with corruption and clientelism that can be traced back to the formation of the Greek nation-state but 
took shape after the transition to democracy in 1974. Greek citizens are to blame, thus, and must 
implement austerity policies, as dictated by European and international mechanisms, in order to be-
come like the other Western European countries. Based on assumptions that predate the crisis, this 
narrative4 was disseminated systematically by international and national economic and political elites 
and mainstream media from 2010 to 2014. It is important to highlight the role played by the national 
mass media in this process: corporate Greek media is owned and controlled by big conglomerates, 
representing powerful economic and business interests. During the crisis, mainstream media mag-
nates have been accused of allowing their own business interests to influence editorial decisions to 
limit coverage to pro-EC, ECB and IMF agendas and to censor alternative opinions.5 
2.1 Crisis as an opportunity (2010–2012)
When accused of corruption, one veteran Pasok minister said in 2010 “Mazi ta fagame” (we all ate 
it together),6 implying that all Greeks were equally responsible for colluding in practices of patron-
age and petty corruption. The two parties that, alternately, dominated the government of the coun-
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try for the past 40 years (Pasok, on the centre-left, and New Democracy, on the centre-right) and 
which formed the coalition government that was in power from June 2012 to January 2015, have 
since the outset of the crisis resorted to the argument that all levels of society are to blame. The 
political system, along with society as a whole, had refused to rationalise, opting to maintain pre-
modern practices: public servants were the first to be disgraced by politicians and media outlets.7 
Greek citizens were pictured as young disobedient children who were refusing to grow up and were 
provided instead with the opportunity from above to reform themselves.8 The crisis was presented 
as a supernatural phenomenon, cast on the people, and economics as separate from politics – it 
was therefore irrelevant to think of causes or alternatives.9 Moreover, official political discourse 
and daily media coverage referred to the negative ways in which Greece was being depicted in the 
foreign media and the decisions that EU representatives were making about the country’s future, 
thus legitimising the dependency of the country on foreign actors.10 Still, the crisis was represent-
ed as an opportunity for the country to finally become modern and for the Greeks to become hard 
working, competitive and disciplined.11 
Interlude: 2012 elections
However, things changed rapidly. The development of parallel national crises in Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain shifted the attention from the cultural particularities of the Greeks towards the systemic nature 
of the Europe-wide crisis. At the same time, it was becoming evident to more citizens that the aus-
terity measures were disastrous, not only because they generated poverty among the most under-
privileged parts of society (women, pensioners and youth), but for actually delivering recession, not 
growth. During the build-up to the May 2012 elections, the political elites and the media launched a 
fierce campaign to purge the debate of alternative points of view and eliminate criticism of the mem-
orandums by putting forth false dilemmas: do Greek citizens wish to reject troika policies and live 
on food coupons? Will Greece remain a part of the European Union or become a third-world coun-
try?12 Sticking with austerity was the only route to survival. However, the small leftwing Syriza party, 
which took 4.7 percent of the vote in the 2009 elections, won 27 percent of the vote and became the 
main opposition to a coalition government formed by New Democracy, Pasok and Democratic Left. 
2.2 Crisis with no alternative (2012–2014)
While public opinion in Europe began to show more recognition of the disproportionate price Greeks 
had to pay, in Greece the hegemonic discourse became more aggressive. In this latter state, which 
lasted at least until the January 2015 elections, and within the context of declining support for the 
political mainstream, austerity measures could not be, and were no longer, presented as a positive 
opportunity. Instead, amid what was being described as a humanitarian crisis, deprivation and loss 
were simply the price that Greek citizens had to pay for their past. As has been the case with other 
countries in the past, Greek citizens were told that “there is no alternative” (TINA) to this “state of 
emergency” that brought misery and suffering:13 the consequences of denying this solution were 
pictured as even more dramatic and chaotic. However, as decisions were taken by experts, while 
collective reactions, such as strikes or protests, were stigmatised, each citizen was presented as 
responsible for him- or herself and should be left alone to deal with unemployment, injustice, de-
pression and anger. Contentious activity was presented as part of an underdeveloped culture im-
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peding progress,14 as reflected in the spread of the theory of the two extremes, which was used 
to equate collective political protest against austerity with racist violence;15 the promemorandum 
coalition government could no longer guarantee the wellbeing of Greek citizens, but at least pro-
vided them with a minimum of law and order. The “Greek crisis” repeatedly legitimised the impo-
sition of emergency policies and legislation that circumvented human, political and social rights.16
Cleavages and frames 
Since 2010, thus, memoranda have become a focal point of all political and ideological debates in 
Greece: anyone who attempts to articulate a point of view beyond the mainstream finds himself or 
herself in a position of opposition. As a result, the “antimemorandum” bloc hosts an increasing num-
ber of crisis discourses, which are often contradictory. There are cases when self-castigation over the 
country’s deficiencies becomes the flipside of a self-narcissism related to its unique historical herit-
age: the far right is on the rise. All stories are made up of ideas deeply embedded in the national politi-
cal psyche and, for this reason, have little causal relation to the actual crisis unravelling in the country. 
It is not surprising, thus, to discover striking similarities with narratives dominating public discourse 
also in other countries hit by the crisis. In this sense, the memorandum has evolved into a cleavage 
in terms of political discourse and serves as a dividing line that cuts across the political spectrum af-
fecting all political groups while providing them with the necessary “toolkits” to clearly define them-
selves and the “other”.17 Within the same storyline, the metapolitefsi has evolved into something much 
more than a concept denoting a mere chronological period of time or a series of events to become 
the frame for making sense of what is now at stake, by putting an order on complex temporalities 
and causalities and providing a before and after. According to the dominant narrative, the country’s 
post-1974 past is to blame for the troublesome present and the uncertain future. It is an interpretative 
tool, thus, through which a story about the national self and the Western other is told while it is be-
ing created and, for this reason, it is also encountered in other southern European countries in crisis. 
The metapolitefsi has turned into a frame, that is, a schema of interpretation that enables individuals 
to locate, perceive and label occurrences within their life space and world at large, in interaction with 
the wider political culture, public discourse, values and orientations of society.18 
Narratives, thus, about the crisis in post-1974 Greece are not merely histories accounting for a lin-
ear sequence of facts, but frameworks that define understandings of the self, as well as organise 
a diagnosis of the problem and dictate political solutions and prescriptive policies. 
3. The story of a failed national transition in the national  
and international context
We examined above how the metapolitefsi has been used as a frame to retrospectively criticise the 
postdictatorial failed transition to a Western European, liberal-type democracy: as we will show 
below, this idea has been an inherent part of long-embedded understandings of Greece’s national 
history and compatible with broader understandings of what “ought to be”, first, a postwar welfare 
state and, later on, a postwelfare state.
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3.1. The predictable backlash of the underdog culture
The great impact the above narrative had on public opinion is related to a deeply ingrained belief in 
national culture which explains the unfolding of national history after 1974 as a conflict between tra-
dition and modernity. In the early 1990s, Nikiforos Diamandouros, a scholar who had been involved 
in studies of transition in the European south in the 1980s, described this cultural dualism that was 
deeply entrenched in postdictatorship Greece as a tug of war between an “underdog” and a mod-
ernising political culture.19 This has since been disseminated to political discourse and has become 
a reference point for understanding modern Greece and the country’s relation to Europe. While the 
latter of the two cultures is described in an undeniably more favourable light, as compatible with the 
secularism, rationalism, democracy and free market economics prevalent in the more “developed” 
societies of Western Europe, the latter is viewed as a predemocratic, nationalist, introverted and 
highly defensive culture that bears the imprint of the Ottoman tradition and the Byzantine past and 
favours clientelistic networks of power while remaining phobic of market forces and the West in 
general.20 According to Diamandouros, the creation of a modern nation-state in Greece intensified 
this struggle and generated huge social tensions and dividing lines in Greece, as bureaucratic and 
rational institutions had to be adopted by “traditional and precapitalist, indigenous structures”.21 The 
cultural camp, influenced by the Enlightenment and aiming at reform through fostering a Western 
liberal polity in the country, was constantly hampered by the most traditionalist, underdeveloped 
and least competitive parts of the society, those personifying the underdog culture that impeded 
reforms, especially after 1974, and prevented the country from experiencing a successful transi-
tion. This distinction is so profound and all-encompassing that elements of both cultures are to be 
found across the political spectrum, in both the left- and rightwing forces, Diamandouros argued. 
Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2010, this postdictatorship “underdog” culture has been roundly 
attacked, both abroad and domestically, for bringing the country to the verge of economic and po-
litical bankruptcy. No matter how exceptional circumstances may appear during the crisis, cultural 
dualism has been commonplace in the discussion of Greek political culture since the very founda-
tions of the state: its loaded historical background and its unique language differentiated the coun-
try from the “barbarian” Muslim East and from its Slavic neighbours, while, on the other hand, this 
“cradle of civilisation” remained, after all, a poor and economically underdeveloped country differ-
ent from industrialised Western Europe, where it allegedly “belonged”. Modernity in Greece has 
been equated with Westernisation and was seen as the opposite to the Ottoman past and Byzan-
tine traditions, which were presented as incompatible with modern democratic institutions. The 
past was contrasted with the present, as tradition was seen as inferior to the future. On the other 
hand, modernity was harshly criticised, not because of its principles but because of its connotation 
with “foreign” social actors intervening in internal politics as well as with domestic actors who un-
critically praised everything that originated in the “West”. Already since the foundation of the Greek 
state in 1832, political groups and agents instrumentalised national traditions and modernisation 
prospects in different ways, in a long-lasting effort to come to terms with the past and an always 
“more developed” West that was equated with the future. 
The transition to a parliamentary republic in 1974 seemed to put Greece finally on the long desired 
path to modernisation, due to the reforms that took place after the end of the seven-year military 
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junta and the abolition of the monarchy. In a very short period of time, Greece ceased to be an 
agrarian society; the tertiary sector became dominant, which was followed by rapid upward social 
mobility. The political and ideological divisions that had persisted within Greek political and social 
life since the civil war also formally ended with the abolition of the exclusionary state of emergency 
and the establishment of a competitive political system. Reforms in the education sector, the de-
velopment of a welfare state, the renewal of political personnel, and the democratisation of pub-
lic life introduced to public discourse terms such as “equal opportunities”, “social justice” and “po-
litical rights”.22 Notwithstanding the gradual introduction of the country to the family of European 
liberal democracies, the so-called particularities of Greece persisted; the country never became a 
profoundly industrial one, while the “premodern” traits of the national political culture and the “pre-
capitalist” modes of society remained intact: an atrophic civil society, clientelism, grey economic 
activities and feelings of strong nationalism served to marginalise the country.23 
The dualism between tradition and modernity has defined the ways in which Greek national identity 
has been formed throughout the twentieth century and especially after its transition to democracy. 
In this respect, the concept and the uses of the term “clientelism” was transformed by a generation 
of scholars into the fundamental interpretative key for explaining political behaviour and state– 
society relations in the post-1974 period.24 In an influential book published by the historian and 
anthropologist John Campbell and based on his research in the Greek mountains just after the 
civil war, Greek society was on the border of the European world, on the dividing line between ra-
tional societies and those ruled by habit, guilt and shame.25 The sociologist Nicos Mouzelis located 
Greece, along with the Balkans and Latin America, in a cluster of belated modernised countries, 
in which traditional clientelism was transformed from a personal system belonging to premodern 
societies to a bureaucratic one that characterised modern societies, without however putting an 
end to the state’s despotism or creating a robust civil society.26 Konstantinos Tsoukalas empha-
sised the role of the state in Greece, which continued to serve the interests of a dominant class 
by creating state personnel through a machinery serving clientelistic interests.27 With no clear-cut 
class divisions and efficient state functions, Greek society is compartmentalised along extensive 
family ties and clientelist practices that have generated an all-encompassing culture of corrup-
tion:28 this is a structural feature, cutting across society and historically embedded in an inherent 
rejection of the rule of law, that is attributed to the Greek psyche of resistance to the Ottomans. 
Diamandouros somehow managed to grant coherence to these analyses by attributing the clash 
between westernised institutions and traditional parts of society not only to the political system but 
to the national political culture as a whole.29
According to the works of these scholars, when compared to the western patterns of econom-
ic development, Greece proceeded to industrialisation and modernity in a belated, dependent and 
anomalous way, which was blended with anomic patterns, clientelistic relationships, state inter-
ventionism and populist political parties. It is a narrative replete with historical absences: Greece 
never had an aristocracy or a proper working class, did not undergo the Enlightenment or industrial 
revolution and did not experience liberalism. Paradoxical as it may sound, this balancing between 
a troubled tradition and an always desired modernity has, at the same time, propelled dominant 
feelings of Greek exceptionalism. But even if the idea of Greek underdevelopment and, at the same 
time, exceptionalism cuts across political divisions (and keeps haunting the Greek left, as well), this 
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does mean that interpreting the past has been a consensual process. On the contrary, as evident 
above in the way the post-1974 past has been narrated and has given shape to the country’s pres-
ent, interpreting the past has been an arena of rival social visions, class divisions and interests over 
who is to blame, what is to be done and by whom. As we will show in the next part, such compet-
ing narratives regarding transition have not been linked only to conflictual transformations within 
the country, but also to broader ones regarding the European project and global developments.
3.2. Failed transitions as an inherent norm of modernity 
At the same time, there has been a growing field of scholarly work that has challenged this schema 
of cultural dualism and its overwhelming domination over interpretations of national identity by offer-
ing instead alternative perspectives.30 According to this work, the contradiction between tradition and 
modernity is seldom so clearly compartmentalised and clear-cut in real life, as it penetrates public 
life and groups of people, but also the identity of each individual, creating tensions and complexities. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to ignore the fact that everyday life more than often appears to confirm 
the tradition–modernity cleavage to an impressive degree. In the last few turbulent years in Greece, 
binary oppositions set by this scheme re-emerged with a vehemence, both in terms of public opinion 
and academic and political discourse. 
This might be the case as this explanatory framework is far from confined to the Greek case only: 
the peculiarities represented through cultural dualism have been generally addressed to societies 
in transition from a premodern to a modern era. Scholarly arguments that dominate academia and 
political discourse understand modern Greece as being somewhere between a past and a future, 
the periphery and the centre, modernity and tradition: this is a thesis apparently imbued with the 
evolutionism that marked social and political theory especially in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s.31 
According to this, in most societies reform processes did not provoke a conflict between new and 
old, as the new is built upon the old. Modernity, as the process of transformation and rationalisa-
tion of human societies, is rooted in tradition, while reform is an endogenous change not requir-
ing abrupt ruptures with the past. This process, however, describes the way industrialised liberal 
Western European democracies were modernised and, as such, implies a differentiation between 
those and the rest of the world and legitimises specific patterns of modern development while ex-
cluding others. In the case of peripheral capitalist societies, such as Greece, tradition and moderni-
ty emerge as conflictual trends in an antagonistic relationship. According to modernisation theory, 
time evolves in a linear and progressive way and as a result, in the case of countries that did not 
follow the prescribed path of evolution, it unavoidably brings about radical ruptures with the past 
so as to restore “normality” in the flow of progress. It is only by uprooting tradition that reform can 
be implemented so that all societies can become modern. Within this narrative, there are two op-
tions: either any signs of traditional particularities are eradicated or the country is alienated from 
the family of developed societies.32 
Notwithstanding widespread and lucid critiques of modernisation theory, this has dominated West-
ern social science especially in what regards the field of “transition studies” as a knowledge effect 
of the Cold War. Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead’s 1986 book Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Southern Europe triggered a wealth of works trying to frame the collapse of the dictatori-
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al regimes in southern Europe, but also Latin America and, some years later, Eastern Europe. It 
was within this context that clientelism acquired in the 1980s a new, all-encompassing interpre-
tative capacity in relation to southern European peripheral countries and that the Greek passage 
to democracy after seven years of authoritarianism was read as a “velvet transition” to “normal-
cy”. According to “transitology”, what differentiated peripheral countries from those at the core is 
considered an anomaly, a weakness or an aberration. Research initiatives adopting this approach 
have offered new insights; yet, they have remained overtly teleological and deterministic: periph-
eral societies were read in the context of a readiness or lack of readiness for reform.33 The pas-
sage from authoritarianism to democratisation was read ahistorically and in relation with party 
and top–down politics, while local contexts and cultural traditions, social mobilisations and protest 
movements were ignored if they were not compatible with a prescribed pattern of later develop-
ment. Read through the interpretative frame of transition, the history of those countries became 
loaded with normative expectations and prescriptive policies as to how the past should be read 
and the future should unravel. 
In the post-Second World War context, modernisation theory took the form of development stud-
ies, in what concerns the postcolonial field, and transition studies, regarding mainly the ex-com-
munist world: in both cases a new role was ascribed to the developed Western world that was 
prosperous and stable enough to lead the “underdeveloped” countries the world over towards 
progress. Postsocialist and postcolonial critique has revealed how the epistemological categories 
constructed along the axes of tradition/modernity have generated specific representations of the 
“self” and the “other” and a whole imagery and vocabulary about those being “different”. Particular-
ly since the end of the Cold War, European integration and access to EU membership has become 
the dominant, if not the exclusive, institutional framework and the ultimate paradigm of western 
modernity. Within this context, countries at the geopolitical and economic centre of Europe, such as 
Germany, France or the Netherlands, are synonymous with being both “modern” and “European”, 
while countries at the southern and central-eastern periphery of Europe seek to confirm their “Eu-
ropeanness” by implementing endless series of reforms. As examined above in the case of Greece, 
the discourse on modernisation internally divides those societies deemed not-yet modern and is 
internalised by citizens in the form of collective guilt. At the same time, it has been used to divide 
former colonies and non-European countries from the European core by contributing to the crea-
tion of the European canon. What becomes, however, evident through the dominant narrative on 
the Greek crisis is that this discourse is now further instrumentalised to differentiate and generate 
hierarchies within Europe itself. The “other” is no longer beyond the civilised European borders, in 
the “waiting room of history”.34 Transitology now takes the form of an intra-European orientalism, 
according to which the “other” is internal and has to suffer for his or her sins. 
Narrating the past according to this normative view of transition, thus, runs through transitology, 
development studies as well as the field of European integration. While principally referring to so-
cieties in transition from a premodern to a modern era, this cultural dualism ended up forming part 
of the European canon of history.35 This frame of understanding not only articulates, but at the same 
time fosters particular identities, hierarchies and power dynamics in different spaces, contexts and 
periods. What is currently termed “global governance” is also structured along these lines: in this 
new sophisticated form of internationalism, according to historian Mark Mazower, formal supra-
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national institutions play a relatively minor role while business-like networks of middle-level 
government officials from different countries get things done. Even if introduced as respectful 
of notions of inclusiveness, ethics and obligation, global governance yet implies a deep suspi-
cion of formal political institutions, participatory democracy and big government.36 This new mode 
of governance has been criticised for bearing the imprint of contemporary imperialism and forms 
of domination, as it leaves little space for “people” to disagree, demand and resist; no conflicts or 
actual politics take place. This is related to an overall paradigm shift concerning understandings of 
state power that has been taking place since the 1980s at an international level. The post-Cold War 
and postimperial world is experiencing a radical erosion of sovereignty and of the role of “demos” 
as an agent of change and thus of history. 
Conclusion
Narratives on the Greek crisis that depart from a re-evaluation of the recent past can only be under-
stood as part of broader, transnational discourses on modernity and the changing role of the state 
within them. Departing from modernisation theories of the 1960s and transitology assumptions, 
while also resonating with the new mode of global governance, the dominant narrative described 
in the first part relates economic hardships to the passage to democracy in a causal way: populism, 
corruption, a lack of respect for social hierarchies, endemic protest movements and other tradition-
alist traits have given shape to an underdog political culture that is said to have become hegemonic 
since the restoration of democracy, generating profligate public spending and impeding reforms and 
modernisation. The “memorandum” has absorbed the ever-existing “tradition–modernity” cleavage 
defining Greek political culture and the metapolitefsi has been transformed into the dominant frame 
for understanding what is at stake in the country. But the need to modernise through imposed, top–
down reforms no longer refers to a rationalisation of the state, as it used to when Greece was repeat-
edly accused of belated modernisation; the country is once again at odds with European standards, 
but the governing rules have now changed: “demos” now plays a minor, if any role. 
According to the dominant explanatory narrative for what is currently happening, this is a crisis of a 
failed national transition. Still, this convincing story is actually the result of a conflict between com-
peting social and class visions within and beyond the country and the product of broader transfor-
mations and of the crisis of the European project as a whole. Apart from challenging ideas about 
Greek exceptionalism, what is interesting in retracing the construction of this narrative is to ob-
serve how history is related to the contemporary crisis. Greek society in crisis has turned with ur-
gency to the national past and re-read its transition to democracy, so as to make sense and render 
meaningful its troubled present. A product of media representations, business and elite interests 
and party politics, cultural traditions, national stereotypes but also international developments, 
popular dreams, anxieties and fears, this revisiting of the past has produced new historical mean-
ings and vocabularies of its own. Exceeding the words or deeds of the individuals or groups articu-
lating them, the stories told about the metapolitefsi form a sum bigger than their parts and acquire 
a life of their own. In this way, they become at the same time a crucial agent in actually creating 
the crisis, as we now experience it. 
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Like all historical events, however, the contemporary crisis, as well as the way we narrate it, has 
not been the result of a well-orchestrated conspiracy imposed from above but is the product of 
multiple interests, profits, politics, and unexpected encounters of people, desires and contingency. 
Even if current developments have disempowered people’s agency by intensifying a shift to the so-
called “demo-crisis”, they have also generated the political space and the imaginaries to critically 
reflect on, challenge and collectively react against it. By experiencing yet another transition, Greece 
has become an observatory for contemporary radical transformations of all kinds.
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